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In Hidden Places: Congressional Legislation That
Limits the Scope of the National Environmental
Policy Act
Aaron Ehrlich*
1. Introduction
Often cited as the birth of the American environmental legislative
revolution,' Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") in 1969.2 Broadly stated, NEPA requires that agencies "consider
the environmental consequences of their actions," provide the public with
information about such actions, and allow according public comment.3
Understanding the ardent opposition by many members of Congress
to NEPA and their intent to limit NEPA compliance, the drafters sought to
ensure that the statute would have uniform application to all federal actions
that impact the environment in a significant manner.' By duly delegating
enforcement to the Executive Branch, in the form of the Council on Environmental Quality,' and the Judicial Branch, in the form of permissible judicial review,6 the drafters believed the structure of NEPA would thwart attempts to avoid NEPA's requirements.7 While resolute in their intent to
ensure NEPA compliance, the drafters could not bar a much simpler way to
avoid NEPA - congressional enactment of project-specific exemptions and
modifications to NEPA.8

I.D. Candidate, May 2007, University of California Hastings College of the Law. Mr.
Ehrlich was the recipient of the Albert G. Evans Award in Private Enterprise for this
note.
I. Jerry Anderson, The Environmental Movement at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS L.I. 395,
396(1995).
2.

42 U.S.C.S. §§4321-4370 (2007).

3.

Alabama ex. rel. Siegelman v. U.S. EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504 (11th Cir. 1990).

4.

H.R. REP. No. 91-378, at 2751 (1969).

5.

42 U.S.C.S. §§.4341-4347 (2007).

6. Though judicial review is not explicitly stated in the text of NEPA, courts
have held that the statute implicitly provides it. See Envtl. Defense Fund v. Corps of
Eng'rs of the U.S. Army, 470 F.2d 289, 294 (8th Cir, 1972).
7.

H.R. REP. No. 91-379, at 2754.

8.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Weinberger, 562 F. Supp. 265, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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Environmentalists may underestimate the impact of NEPA exemptions. Project-specific exemptions are not unique to NEPA. 9 Moreover, because NEPA contains only procedural mandates, exemptions may seem to
carry less impact on the environment compared to exemptions from substantive statutes such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act.'"
. A discussion of NEPA exemptions, however, is exceedingly important
at this juncture for a number of reasons. First, Congress has shown a much
greater propensity for passing NEPA exemptions than exemptions from any
other environmental statute." Second, the increasing prevalence of NEPA
exemptions has paved the way for other exemptions.'" Third, the Council on
Environmental Quality ("CEO") regulations provide for emergency exemptions from NEPA, yet Congress has consistently chosen to enact projectspecific exemptions instead of allowing agencies to use the emergency regulations.' 3 Is this owing to insufficiencies within the CEO regulations or is
there a more nefarious explanation? Fourth, the exemptions raise substantive concerns of both potential abuse of the legislative process and the creation of poor public policy."
Surprisingly, there is extremely limited scholarship available discussing the manner, means, and impact of congressional legislation granting
NEPA exemptions and modification.'" This note will provide a survey of
each. Part 11provides background information on NEPA, Part IIIdescribes
judicially pronounced exemptions to NEPA, Part IV describes statutory exemptions to NEPA, Part V discusses project-specific exemptions to NEPA,
and Part VI explores alternatives to project-specific exemptions.
Constructing a comprehensive index of congressional legislation providing NEPA exemptions and modifications is virtually impossible due to
two contemporary trends. Congress generally provides project-specific exemptions and modifications in appropriation bills,' 6 buried in thousands of

9. Richard Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J.
619, 638 (2006).
10. Pa. Protect Our Water and Envtl. Res., Inc. v. Appalachian Reg'l Comm'n, 574 F.
Supp. 1203, 1212 (M.D. Pa. 1982).

11. Victor Sher & Carol Sue Hunting, Eroding the Landscape, Eroding the Laws: Congressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental Law, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 435,
438 (1991).
12.

Id.

13.. Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations
Riders: A ConstitutionalCrisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 459 (1997).
14.

Lazarus, supra note 9, at 632.

15.

See generally Lazarus, supra note 9; Sher & Hunting, supra note II.

16.

Lazarus, supra note 9, at 638.
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page of provisions. Also, Congress often does not mention NEPA by name

in the legislation, preferring to rely upon language that implicitly exempts or
modifies NEPA's application to the project.'7 Making the task more difficult,
Congress frequently includes provisos which eliminate or limit the scope of
judicial review, thereby significantly limiting the case law which discusses
such exemptions.8
il. NEPA Background
Congress's stated purpose for NEPA is:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.'9
The first portion establishes that the purpose of NEPA is to facilitate
interaction between human development and the environment, thus dispelling any myth that NEPA's sole concern is that of the environment." The
second portion establishes that human development and the environment
are inextricably linked, and a balance between the two is necessary for the
betterment of both.2' The third portion establishes that while a balance is
needed, NEPA specifically emphasizes the environment in order to facilitate
preservation.22
To effectuate the purposes discussed above, NEPA requires federal
agencies to:
IlInclude in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on - -

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

17.

Nat'l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 161 F. Supp. 2d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2001).

18. .Sher & Hunting, supra note 11, at 438.
19.

42 U.S.C.S. § 4321 (2007).

20.

Id.

21.

42 U.S.C.S. § 4321 (2007).

22.

Id.
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(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented."23
This detailed statement, known as an "Environmental Impact Statement"
("EIS"), 24 forms the cornerstone of NEPA.2' As NEPA does not define "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,"26 the CEO has promulgated regulations to clarify and guide agencies
in preparing an EIS.27
While certain projects require an EIS, the CEO regulations allow an
agency to prepare an "Environmental Assessment" ("EA") to determine if an
EIS is needed.28 An EA:
(1) briefly provides sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an environmental impact statement
or a finding of no significant impact,
(2) aids an agency's compliance with the Act when no environmental impact statement is necessary and
(3) facilitates preparation of a statement when one is necessary.

29

Substantively, an EA "shall include brief discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives .... of the environmental impacts of the proposed action and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons consulted."3
The agency must then prepare a "Finding of No Significant Impact" ("FONSI")
if the EA determines that the project does not qualify for an EIS under 42

23.

Id,§ 4332(C) (2007).

24.

40 C.F R. § 1502 eL seq. (2007).

25.

Young v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 99 F. Supp. 2d 59, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

26.

42 U.S.C.S. § 4332(C) (2007).

27.

40C.F.R. § 1502 etseq. (2007).

28.

Id. § 1508.9.

29.

4d .1508.9(a).

30.

40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b).
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U.S.C. § 4332(c).' A FONSI must justify the agency's decision that it is not
necessary to prepare an EIS."
If the agency is required to prepare an EIS or if an EA determines an
EIS is needed, the overseeing agency must prepare and file a Notice of Intent," to be published in the Federal Register.34 The Notice of Intent details
the scope of the action, the issues to be addressed by the EIS, what parties
will be involved in its preparation, and a schedule."
After the Notice of Intent has been filed, the agency prepares a draft
EIS 36 that is distributed to the parties involved and the public. The agency
then solicits comments on the contents of the EIS." After the comment period ends, the agency must issue a final EIS.38
1i1. Judicially Pronounced NEPA Exemptions
For nearly four decades, courts have been responsible for interpreting
NEPA to address and reconcile textual ambiguities.39 To effectuate Congress's intent in enacting NEPA, courts have created a number of exemptions from its requirements." Three judicially created exemptions are of
special importance.
A.

The Functional Equivalence Exemption

The first judicially pronounced exemption, the "functional equivalence"
exemption, was created in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus.4 1 The D.C.
Circuit held that NEPA's requirements will not apply when another statute,
also designed to protect the environment, includes requirements similar to
that of NEPA. 42 The Court concluded that a Preliminary Statement of Find-

31.

Id. § 1508.13.

32.

Id.

33.

Id. § 1508.22.

34.

Id. § 1501.7.

35.

Id.

36.
37.

Id. § 1502.9.
Id. §s1503.1.

38.

Id. §§ 1502.9, 1503.4.

39.

Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 787 (1976).

40.

Id.

41. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), superseded
by statute, 15 U.S.C.S. § 793(c)(1) (2007), as recognized in Amer. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. U.S.
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The principle of the "functional equivalence" exemption continues to be good law.
42.

PortlandCement Ass'n, 486 F.2d at 381.
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ings, a Supplemental Statement of Findings, and the availability of public
comment regarding rulemaking for section I 1l of the Clean Air Act, served
the same purpose as an EIS. The dispute arose from the EPA's adoption of
source standards for certain cement plants. 43 The EPA.prepared a "Supplemental Statement in Connection with Final Promulgation" as part of its
rulemaking process.44 Both Statements considered the environmental impact of the new source standards. 4' The Court concluded that requiring two
ElSs would not serve any interest advanced by NEPA or the Clean Air Act,
and would only result in costly duplication.' Thus, compliance with section
Il1

of the Clean Air Act excuses NEPA requirements.47

B. The Irreconcilable Conflict Exemption
The U.S. Supreme Court created the second exemption, the "irreconcilable conflict" exemption, in Flint Ridge Development Company v. Scenic Rivers
Association of Oklahoma.4' The court held that NEPA compliance is not required when a statute mandates administrative action which makes compliance impossible. 49 The Court specifically concluded that'the Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") was not required to follow NEPA
requirements, when reviewing a developer's disclosure statements under the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.'0 The Act required that HUD review the disclosure statements within thirty days for compliance, which did
not give HUD enough time to prepare an EIS. 5 Examining the text of NEPA
and its legislative history, the Court concluded that "where a clean and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists, NEPA must give way."' 2
C.

The Displacement Exemption

The Sixth Circuit found a third exemption in Pacific Legal Foundation v.
Andrus. 3 The Court held that when complying with other federal environ-

46.

Id. at 378.
Id.at 379.
Id.
Id. at 384.

47.

Id. at 385.

48.

Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776 (1976).

49.

Id.at 778.

50.

id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

Pacific Legal Foundation v.Andrus, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981).

43.
44.

45.
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mental statutes, a federal agency need not comply with NEPA.'4 The Circuit
specifically concluded that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was not required to prepare an EIS when listing a species as endangered." The Secretary of the Service decided that they need not produce an EIS because the
Endangered Species Act stated that the Service need not consider the environmental impact of listing a species as endangered. 6 The CEO confirmed
the Secretary's decision." Relying on what it saw as analogous reasoning in
Portland Cement, the court concluded that the purpose of NEPA would not be
furthered by the preparation of an EIS, because the Secretary's actions already meant to improve the environment."8
IV.

Statutory and Administrative NEPA Exemptions

Both the text of NEPA and the CEO regulations provide very few exemptions from NEPA's requirements. The only exemption commonly used
is for emergencies." The lack of statutory and administrative exemptions
may partially explain the frequency of congressional project-specific exemptions.
Understanding that producing an EIS is a lengthy process and that
agencies must be able to swiftly react to unexpected situations, the CEO
promulgated Rule 1506.11, the emergency exemption.6 0 To qualify, the acting agency must "consult with the Council about alternative arrangements"
to normal NEPA compliance. 6 ' The Rule limits such qualifying actions to
those necessary to "control the immediate impacts of the emergency.62
V.

Project-Specific Legislative NEPA Exemptions

. NEPA is triggered when a "major federal action" significantly affects
"the quality of the human environment." 3 Congress may explicitly or implicitly exempt specific projects by circumventing this threshold language, using
a variety of phrases.' Congress has used virtually all of the qualifying ]an-

54.

Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1504 (9th Cir. 1995).

55.

Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 841.

56.

Id. at 830.

57.

Id.

58. Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 837; Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
59.

40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2007).

60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.

Id.

63.

42 U.S.C.S. § 4332(C) (2007).

64.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Weinberger, 562 F. Supp. 265, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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guage in NEPA to exempt projects from the statute's requirements." This
section will explain some of the various methods.
Although a wide range of statutory language is used to exempt, four
distinct patterns have emerged as being the favored means. The most
common is to provide that the specific federal action does not fall under
NEPA. The text will generally read: "X action shall not be considered a major federal action which significantly affects the quality of the human environment. "' The second most common is to provide that the action lacks
one of the necessary qualifications to trigger NEPA, such as "X action shall
be deemed non-discretionary for the purposes of NEPA,' 67 or "X action shall
be deemed as not major for the purposes of NEPA."' The third most common is to provide the agency a short time to comply with NEPA requirements, allowing the agency to seek a judicial mandate that the agency may
eliminate or limit NEPA compliance under the irreconcilable conflict exemption.69 The fourth most common is to explicitly limit the agency's need to
comply in a particular manner.7" Associated with such pattern, legislation
will often eliminate judicial review of an agency's compliance.'
Each pattern is addressed in detail in this Part, infra.
Compounding the troublesome nature of project-specific NEPA exemptions, Congress often writes them into appropriation bills.72 Such bills
provide funding for federal activities and often run thousands of pages. 3
The buried exemptions usually attract little public attention, raising concerns that the exemptions "do not provide for the kind of meaningful public
debate and deliberation that proved so important in the fashioning of the
comprehensive environmental protection laws of the 1970s and 1980s. "4
One should not assume that all exemptions from NEPA requirements
are rooted in private special interests and corruption. Rather, the majority
of exemptions are supported by a conceivably legitimate public policy inter-

65. See generally Lamar Smith, Legislation Limiting the Scope of NEPA Requirements, http://knowledge.fhwa.dot.gov/ReNEPA/ReNepa.nsf/aa5aec9f63be385c
852568cc0055ea 16/ff96bfdfd3bcd 15c85256bdI 00436523?OpenDocument (last visited
Apr. 25, 2007).
66.

E.g., 42 U.S.C.S. § 2297(h-5)(g) (2007).

67. E.g., 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act, Pub. L. No.
105-174, § 3002, 112 Stat. 58 (1998).
68.

E.g., 16 U.S.C.S. § 497c(i) (2007).

69.

E.g., 7 U.S.C.S. § 2814 (2007).

70.

E.g., 10 U.S.C.S. § 2667 (2007).

71.

E.g., Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 719(h) (2007).

72.

Lazarus, supra note 9, at 639.

73.

id, at 634.

74.

Id.at 632.
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est. Even so, it is critically important to analyze both the procedural form
and substantive impacts of such exemptions.
Complete Non-Qualification

A.

On numerous occasions, Congress has passed legislation granting a
project complete exemption from NEPA. 7' This type of exemption raises the
most substantive concern.76 There is little valid reason why a project should
completely escape NEPA. As discussed below, there are ways to reasonably
reduce an agency's NEPA burden to meet a compelling public interest; however, when Congress provides a blanket exemption, the purpose of the exemption should be questioned.
The Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of
1996 granted a complete exemption to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
for its oversight of gaseous diffusion plants:
The execution of transfer of the lease between the Secretary
and the Corporation or the private corporation, and any extension or renewal thread, shall-not be considered to be a major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment for purposes of section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969." 7
This legislation allowed the federal government to lease gaseous diffusion
plants to private corporations. 7 ' Gaseous diffusion plants enrich uranium
for nuclear power plants.79 While the statute'did require fairly rigorous
qualifications for a private corporation to lease a gaseous diffusion plant,"°
the enrichment of uranium is an exceedingly dangerous process.8 ' Given the
inherent danger, an EIS would have played a critical role in analyzing the risk.
of such a lease, information which would likely have been of great interest to
the public. The lack of an EIS allowed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
to make decisions with potentially life-threatening impact on individuals living near a plant, without having any responsibility to disclose information to

75.

Sher & Hunting, supra note I1,at 482.

76.

Id.

77. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C.S. § 2297(h-5)(g) (2007).
78.

42 U.S.C.S. § 2297(h-5)(g) (2007).

79.

Id. §'2997(h).

80. i e.
2997(h-I)-(h-5).
u
81-. Oliver Houck, Unfinished Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 867, 890 (2002).

West s Northwest, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 2007

residents or to the public. Sadly, the statute did not explain why Congress
deemed this exemption necessary.82
B. Specific Requirement
1. Non-Discretionary
Congress has often passed legislation stating that a project shall be
deemed "non-discretionary" for the purposes of federal law. 3 Congress did
so twice for the Snowbasin Ski Area of Utah - once in the Snowbasin Land
Exchange Act' and once for the area's Trappers Loop Road.85 In the Snowbasin Land Exchange Act, Congress provided that:
[Clonsummation of the land exchanged directed by this section and all determinations, authorizations, and actions taken
by the Secretary pursuant to this section pertaining to Phase I
facilities on National Forest System lands, or any modifications thereof, to be non-discretionary actions.... Such determinations, authorizations, and actions shall not be subject to
administrative or judicial review.6
By deeming land exchanges as non-discretionary actions, Congress implicitly exempted the project from NEPA requirements without referencing the
statute. Compounding the problem, Congress also barred judicial review so
that no one could seek a court decree contesting the legitimacy of this exemption. While the exemption is unlikely to have dire ramifications on the
public, a number of substantive concerns, such as allegations of unfair deals
brokered in the interest of private corporations, have arisen in the last decade concerning such land exchanges." Further, such deals often transfer
National Forest land with valuable timber to logging companies, thereby
eliminating conservation of such land.M By exempting those actions from
NEPA requirements and eliminating judicial review, the Forest Service
avoids publicizing the impact of land exchanges or having them questioned
in court.

82.

42 u.s.c.s. § 2997(h-l)-(h-5).

83. Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-333, § 304, 110 Stat. 4093 (1996).
84.

Id.

85.

1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act § 3002.

86.

Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996 § 304.

87. Bill Paul, Statutory Land Exchanges That Reflect "Appropriate" Value and "Well
Serve" the Public Interest, 27 PUB. LAND & RESOURCEs L. REV. 107, 127 (2006).
88.

Id.at 117.
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In the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act, Congress exempted the Trappers Loop Road by stating:
Construction of the Trappers Loop connector road, and any related actions, by any Federal or state agency or other entity are
deemed to be non-discretionary actions authorized and directed by Congress under title III,
section 304(e)(3) of the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996.89
Again, Congress implicitly exempted the connector road from NEPA requirements by deeming this portion of the project non-discretionary. This
released the Forest Service from justifying the route it chose or addressing
alternative routes that may have been more environmentally sound, as
would be required in an EIS.
2.

Not a Major Federal Action

Congress has often passed legislation describing a project as a "nonmajor federal action" for the purposes of federal law. 9° In the Omnibus Parks
and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Congress allowed the Secretary
of Agriculture to issue ski permits in national forests without NEPA compliance by stating renewals of permits "shall not constitute a major Federal action."' While this exemption is for a relatively small program, it is not wise
public policy to provide for such blanket exemptions, especially with the
availability of supplemental ElSs. Supplemental statements can be used to
update an EIS at minimal cost, due to greatly reduced requirements. This is
a far more prudent choice in light of the changing dynamics of national forests. Without mandatory accounting of geological, environmental, planning,
logging and a plethora of other related, evolving considerations, the allowance of skiing in national forests could prove to be an irresponsible and environmentally detrimental decision. Further, without a recurring EIS or Supplemental EIS, the public cannot comment on the proposed reissuance of
permits.
3.

Limited Time

On numerous occasions, Congress has limited the time a federal
agency has to comply with NEPA requirements. 92 While this is not an explicit exemption from NEPA, a limited timetable for compliance may let the

89.

Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996 § 364.

90.

16 U.S.C.S. § 497c(i) (2007).

91.

Id.

92.

7 U.S.C.S. § 2814(b) (2007).
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agency avoid producing an EIS.93 Preparing an EIS is a daunting task.
Statements generally run a few hundred pages and often span thousands of
pages. 94 The volume of information and data required is enormous; much of
the statement draws on highly sophisticated expertise. Preparing a Draft EIS
can take "three to five months" for "simple projects" and "up to 18 months"
for "complex projects."9 ' Further, there is a mandatory public comment period before an EIS can be considered final.' This adds a minimum of fortyfive to ninety days to the process. 97 These factors and related considerations
often results in an agency needing three years to prepare a Final EIS. Accordingly, when Congress restricts the time to produce an EIS, it is often
impossible for the agency to complete it. The agency can only meet the reduced time frame by completing a less comprehensive EIS or seeking a judicial mandate that the agency cannot reasonably complete the EIS and is
therefore exempt or subject to reduced requirements.
In the Federal Noxious Weed Act of 1974, Congress ordered that compliance with NEPA requirements for implementing plant control agreements
be completed within one year. 98 This statute required the Department of Agriculture to determine what plants qualify as noxious weeds under federal
law, develop a list of such plants based upon scientific evidence, fund a program to eradicate noxious weeds, and establish cooperative agreements
with the states for the same purpose.9 The one-year deadline applied to the
state-federal agreements.' ° It is difficult to predict the degree to which this
narrow limitation burdens the agency. If the agency produced an EIS solely
concerning a state-federal cooperative agreement, the restriction would not
likely have a significant impact; however, if the agency had to include an
agreement along with other matters, the deadline could force the agency to
summarily finish the other parts of the EIS.
4.

Limited Compliance with NEPA

Congress has often limited the scope of an agency's mandatory compliance with NEPA."' This method generally eliminates the need for a

93.

Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 788-89 (1976).

94.

Id.

95.

Id.at 789.

96.

40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2007).

97.

426 U.S. at 789.

98.

7 U.S.C.S. § 2814(b) (2007).

99.

id.

100.

Id.

101.

16 U.S.C.S. § 1379(g) (2007).
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lengthy EIS' 2 by reducing its components °3 or by requiring an EA in lieu of
an EIS."' 4 As described above, an EA is the preliminary document which determines an agency's need to complete an EIS.'0 ' The lesser requirements of
an EA raise concerns that it does not adequately measure the impact of significant projects.'0°
Congress eliminated an otherwise mandatory EIS in section 1379 of
the Marine Mammals Protection Act of 1972:
Neither the transfer of management authority to a State under
subsection (b)(1), nor the revocation or voluntary return of
such authority under subsection (e), shall be deemed to be an
action for
which an environmental impact statement is re7
0

quired.°

This section concerned the taking of marine mammals protected by the
Act 08 and the transfer of federal authority to a state to implement the Act,
contingent on the state's adoption of an implementation plan.' 9 Eliminating the requirement of an EIS seems inconsistent with the requirements of
section 1379(b), which creates strict standards for a state to be eligible for
transfer."0 An EIS would discuss whether the state had taken sufficient
steps to ensure that the Act would be fully complied with, and thus is an
important tool to effect the goals of the Act."' Additionally, the lack of an
EIS eliminates mandatory public comment.
Another worrisome exemption occurred in the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982, in which Congress provided:
The promulgation of standards or criteria in accordance with
the provisions of this section shall not require the preparation
of an environmental impact
statement. . . or to require any en2
vironmental review."

102.

County of Seneca v. Cheney, 12 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1993).

103.

10 U.S.C.S. § 2667(4)(a) (2007).

104.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C.S. § 10165(d) (2007).

105.

40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2007).

106.

Id.

107.
108.

16 U.S.C.S. § 1379(g) (2007).
Id. §1379.

109.

Id. § 1379(b).

110.

Id.

111.

Id.

112.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C.S. § 10141 (c) (2007).
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The standards and criteria regard repositories for disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel." ' Due to the volatile nature of these
materials, the criteria to'determine a site's eligibility for storing nuclear
waste are of utmost importance to ensure environmental and human
safety." 4' Without environmental review of the criteria, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission may make poor decisions concerning storage. An EIS
would have analyzed each criterion to determine its appropriateness according to scientific research."' As such, the elimination of the EIS is simply irresponsible public policy.
Several other provisions in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act limit compliance with NEPA. ' 16 Providing examples of both reasonable and unreasonable limitations, some types of nuclear waste disposal only require an EA. '
The substitution of an EA for an EIS was reasonable when Congress requested a comprehensive study of the "construction of one or more monitored retrievable storage facilities" for "high-level radioactive waste and
spent nuclear fuel.""' Because this provision solely concerns the study addressing storage, the reduced burden is not terribly problematic." 9
However, the replacement of an EIS by an EA was unreasonable when
Congress provided that:
Site specific activities and selection of a site under this section
shall not require the preparation of an environmental impact
statement.... The Secretary shall prepare an environmental
assessment with respect to such selection.2'
This section concerns how the NRC chooses a site to store nuclear waste. 2'
Whereas the preparation of a study does not have any definite impact upon
the environment, site selection certainly does. 22 Requiring an EA instead of
an EIS is problematic for several reasons. First, as a preliminary document
to an EIS, an EA is much briefer in its discussion of the project and potential
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Second, an EA need not discuss alternatives to the proposed
impacts.23'
project unless there is "an unresolved conflict concerning alternative uses of
available resources," whereas an EIS must discuss alternatives.24' Third, an
EA merely lists the federal agencies to be consulted without requiring actual
consultation between agencies. 2
To aid the Department of Defense's leasing of excess military property
to civilians, Congress provided that:
Notwithstanding the National Environmental Policy Act . . .
the scope of any environmental impact analysis necessary to
support an interim lease of property under this subsection
shall be limited to the environmental consequences of activities authorized under the proposed lease and the cumulative
impacts of other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions during the period of the proposed lease. 26
By limiting an EIS to environmental consequences and cumulative impacts,
the Department of Defense did not have to discuss, for example, alternatives
to the proposed action and comparative advantages and disadvantages of
such alternatives.'27 While this limited EIS involves a project with fairly benign impact upon the environment, the future use of limiting provisions
could have a far more troublesome effect.
5. Elimination of Judicial Review
Along with limiting compliance, Congress has passed legislation
eliminating judicial review of an agency's compliance.2 ' This may effectively
grant an exemption, as judicial review is often the only remedy to ensure
compliance. If the agency is unscrupulous, elimination of judicial review
may grant the agency carte blanche.
Congress has barred judicial review several times for controversial projects, potentially involving tremendous impact on the environment. A prime
example: the creation of the Alaskan pipeline system. In the Alaska Natural
Gas Transportation Act, Congress supplanted judicial authority with its own:
The enactment of a joint resolution under section 719f approving the decision of the President shall be conclusive as to the
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legal and factual sufficiency of the environmental
statements submitted by the President relative to
proved.transportation system and no court shall have
tion to consider
questions respecting the sufficiency
29
statements. 1

impact
the apjurisdicof such

The Exxon-Valdez spill consisted of oil transported from this pipeline.'3 ° It has
been argued that the inability to judicially challenge the EIS for failure to
consider alternative ways to transport oil contributed to this disaster. 3 ' Regardless, for any project, eliminating judicial redress of an EIS is disturbing.
The inability to challenge conclusions in the EIS for legal, scientific, or factual accuracy does not promote responsible public policy.
Exemptions from judicial review often occur after a case has been filed
in federal court alleging a violation of NEPA.'32 The effect of such exemptions is to moot the pending case and allow the agency to continue avoiding
compliance. The ethics of such practices are questionable, "when Congress
intervenes to reverse the outcome of federal court decisions without public
debate and with the purpose of benefiting special interests, it leaves behind
'
only the shell of a law without its substance." 33
VI.

Alternatives to Project-Specific Legislative NEPA
Exemptions

Congress has provided many project-specific exemptions from NEPA
requirements. Such exemptions are not a desirable means to address potential shortcomings in the statute. This trend has been detrimental to both
the environment and humans, due to a lack of public comment, a lack of
public information, an inability to seek redress for poor public policy, and a
serious threat of future abuse. As the exemptions are generally placed in
appropriation bills, hidden from public scrutiny, there is a great incentive for
lobbyists to seek similar exemptions from NEPA and other environmental
laws.
One viable explanation for why Congress has chosen to pass projectspecific exemptions: Congress believes NEPA requirements are inappropriate for certain federal actions. Possible reasons for this perception include:
(1)belief that NEPA lacks flexibility and fails to allow for urgent situations,
(2) belief that NEPA is over-inclusive, applying to an overly broad class of
federal actions, or (3) belief that compliance with NEPA is too time-
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consuming and costly. Regardless of the justification, providing a legislative
exemption from NEPA requirements is not the most prudent answer to addressing statutory problems. The logical answer is for Congress to amend
NEPA or recommend to the CEO that it amend its regulations. Such action
would prevent Congress from burying exemptions in appropriations bills,
and provide both the transparency and predictability current exemptions
lack.
The most viable amendment would be for Congress to expand the
CEO's jurisdiction, allowing the CEO to modify NEPA requirements for specific projects based upon demonstrable need. Congress could model this
amendment upon the emergency exemption of 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11, which
allows a federal agency to consult with the CEO to establish alternative
measures for NEPA compliance. Though federal agencies have sparingly
sought an exemption under § 1506.11, the Bureau of Land Management has
been granted exemptions on numerous occasions.'3 4 This reform would decrease the need for Congress to provide project-specific exemptions because
the CEO would be able to reasonably accommodate agencies. Beyond a
significant increase in transparency, the CEO has Unique expertise in dealing with NEPA requirements, and therefore may craft modifications with
greater precision than Congress. In order to avoid potential separation of
powers problems, Congress would have to carefully define the scope of this
delegated power. judicial review of the CEO's decisions could also curtail
separation of powers issues.
A far simpler solution would be for Congress and the CEO to encourage federal agencies to fully utilize the emergency exemption of § 1506.11."'
This would also alleviate the need for project-specific legislative exemptions. The concern is that agencies may not apply for an emergency exemption even when it is available, instead relying upon Congress to provide one.
While statistical analysis is not available, several cases and law review articles have highlighted instances in which a federal action likely would have
been eligible for emergency exemption, but the agency did not apply for one
and later argued there was no time to prepare an EIS. 36 In one alarming example, the Fish and Wildlife Service began capturing and removing Califor-
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nia condors from the wild. 7 Defending its decision to not prepare an EIS,
the Service argued that the action was exempt as an "emergency" action.'38
The Service, however, only sought.an exemption from the CEO after it commenced rescuing the birds.'39 If agencies would seek a timely emergency exemption from the CEO when it is appropriate, Congress would not have to
provide legislative exemptions.
VII. Conclusion
NEPA's historical and contemporary importance cannot be overstated,
yet Congress' use of project-specific legislative exemptions from NEPA requirements threatens to make the statute obsolete in far too many circumstances. The form of such legislative exemptions has been exceedingly diverse, from complete exemptions to denial of. judicial review. This note has
discussed the most common forms of legislative exemptions to both educate the reader on how Congress goes about providing exemptions, and to
address associated problems. Understanding the frequency, form, and problems of such exemptions allows the public to become more vigilant, and ensures that potential abuse is not realized.
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